Syria Is the Key to Containing the Next Wave of Fascism
Sometimes you have to turn lemons into lemonade
The rise of fascism in the 21st century didn’t begin in Ukraine in 2022. It started when Russian fighter jets began their bombing run in Syria. That moment marked the beginning of a new, slow-moving tide—one that would gradually reshape the global balance, destabilize regions, and set the stage for the far-right’s rise across Europe.
Marine Le Pen and Alice Weidel wouldn’t be sitting on solid double-digit support today if not for the immigration crisis that followed. France and Germany might have remained a limited club of far-right flirtation, contained within their national fringes. But the wars—Syria foremost among them—forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes and pour into Europe, searching for safety. That human flood became the accelerant that helped far-right politics burn its way into the European mainstream.
Syria, and Russia’s long, calculated influence in the region, lie at the root of Europe’s immigration crisis. And until Syria finds real safety—until the Iran-Russia grip on the region is broken—it will never breathe free. Both Moscow and Tehran are currently reeling under economic and military strain, their ability to act in Syria constrained. But make no mistake: once they find their footing again, Syria will be the first place where both regimes reassert their hand.
To protect itself from the next wave of chaos, Syria has only two realistic options: align with Turkey, or align with Israel. Both are regional powers with the military muscle and strategic depth to provide Syria with a measure of stability—if they choose to step up.
I had hoped Israel would see the eventual exit of Putin’s proxy, Bashar al-Assad, as an opening to reshape its national security doctrine—to pivot from containment to reconstruction. It could have seized the chance to help rebuild a shattered Syria and forge a new regional balance, one less vulnerable to the malign reach of the Russia-Iran axis. But that shift hasn’t materialized. Israel remains cautious, reactive. Despite the looming threat of a resurgent Tehran-Moscow bloc, its Syria policy remains largely static.
Turkey, on the other hand, has made its move. President Erdoğan is tightening his grip across northern Syria and pulling Damascus into Ankara’s orbit, one calculated step at a time. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Turkey now seeks to bolster Syria’s air defenses—a strategic signal that it intends to entrench its influence and act as Syria’s external shield. That ambition isn’t just theoretical. On the ground, Turkey is already laying the foundations for long-term presence.
Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site.
This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government. Middle East Eye reported that negotiations for the defense pact have "quietly” continued since December 2024.
One of the sources said that Turkey plans to deploy Hisar air defense systems and surveillance and attack drones to provide air cover for the base while construction is underway. The Hisar-A and Hisar-O systems are Turkish short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, respectively.
Yes, Erdoğan is a dictator. It’s difficult to place democratic hopes on his shoulders. But he has clear, self-serving reasons to keep Syria stable: it reduces the refugee pressure on Turkey and gives him a larger platform for regional influence. He smells opportunity in Syria’s ruins—and for better or worse, he’s moving. The rest of the world? Still waiting. But what choice do we have? Not many.
This year and the next will be decisive. Mistakes made now—through inaction or miscalculation—will produce outsized, long-lasting consequences for the democratic world.
If Turkey embeds itself into Syria’s security architecture, it could act as a natural check against Russia and Iran. His mere presence complicates their operations, forces them onto the defensive. But if the West wants to prevent Erdoğan from turning Syria into a neo-Ottoman vassal, then it needs to offer a credible alternative.
Europe and Ukraine must step in—seriously and strategically.
Europe will, as always, think in terms of euros and fiscal limits. But this isn’t just another refugee policy debate or budget line item. Europe is a 450-million-strong consumer market. That power can—and should—be leveraged. Invest a few billion, yes, but more importantly: establish strong bilateral trade mechanisms, give Syria access to markets, supply tools for long-term growth. That’s how you build trust. That’s how you give a post-Assad Syria an incentive to lean toward democracy, not drift into authoritarianism.
Ukraine, too, has a role to play. It can help Syria rebuild its military by exporting weapons, offering free training to new national forces, and sending essential goods—especially agricultural exports that Syria will desperately need. Ukraine understands what it means to fight for sovereignty. That experience could be invaluable to a Syria trying to stand on its own again.
Turkey cannot be the only hand reaching out. If Syria is to breathe freely again, it will take many hands—Turkish, European, and Ukrainian—working not in parallel, but in partnership.
I share your disappointment in Israel's approach to Syria. They are missing an opportunity. I recall Netanyahu's "Blessing" and "Curse" maps at his UN speech last year. The new Syrian regime offers the chance to redraw those maps favorably and he is missing it.
I see in your analysis of Ukraine and the West potentially rebuilding Syria, the US won’t be playing a part. The US has exited the global stage—a vile, treacherous, weak version of its former self. I say that with grief, as an American who loves my country.