Why Did Ukraine Suddenly Pull Out of Kursk? The Answer May Be in London, Not Moscow

A 30-kilometer buffer

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

I was a bit dazed and confused when Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, Oleksander Syrski, ordered his troops out of Kursk. Too many things were happening all at once. It was March 9th—just days after the United States cut off intelligence support to Ukraine, instructed the UK not to pass on data generated by American systems, and may have even grounded the Ukrainian air force.

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But here’s the strange part: Syrski didn’t retreat to reinforce the older front line. He didn’t need to. That line had held—before the U.S. pulled support, during the blackout, and after support resumed. The only major shift was Ukraine’s northern grouping. They moved from operating mostly inside Russian territory to mostly outside it.

So what gives?

Yes, risk exposure would’ve been a factor. But there’s another variable—one that only just came into view. The Trump administration is now backing a cease-fire proposal that looks eerily similar to what the United Kingdom has been quietly pushing from the start.

Trump’s envoy for Ukraine, retired General Keith Kellogg, stepped forward with the details.

He confirmed that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable, comprehensive ceasefire—covering land, air, and sea—for a minimum of 30 days, and is prepared to sign the agreement immediately.

More significantly, Kellogg revealed that Ukraine is willing to accept a "ceasefire in place," which would require both Ukrainian and Russian forces to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline. The resulting 30-kilometer buffer zone would be demilitarized and monitored under a still-undefined mechanism.

To reinforce the deal, Kellogg added that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are prepared to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River. Their mission: to patrol and uphold the terms of the truce.

I back this proposal. It’s still in its early stages, and more layers will inevitably be added as it evolves—but two key factors have already pulled me in favor of it.

First, the United States has stopped pressuring Ukraine to recognize Russian occupation. That’s crucial. In my view, it’s the widest red line. Forcing Ukraine to legitimize Russia’s land grab would effectively endorse the invasion—and open the door for Putin, or whoever comes after him, to launch the next war whenever and wherever he pleases. Holding this line is worth it, even if the U.S. had decided to cut all support. But that’s not where things are heading anymore. Washington isn’t pushing in that direction now.

Second, the proposed 30-kilometer buffer zone will make Putin scream into the void. It creates a verifiable, no-contact space between Ukraine and Russia. With British and French forces expected to remain in Ukraine after the ceasefire, international monitors could be stationed at key points, enabling round-the-clock surveillance. That strips away Russia’s usual ambiguity and deniability. Putin won’t be able to pull his usual tricks—he’ll have to look elsewhere for mischief.

We’ve seen a version of this work before. The Korean Demilitarized Zone, established in 1953, has kept two hostile armies apart for over seventy years—without a formal peace treaty. It’s not perfect, but it has prevented a return to full-scale war. A Ukrainian buffer, if properly enforced, could serve a similar purpose: locking in deterrence, lowering the temperature, and depriving the Kremlin of room to maneuver in the grey zones it thrives on.

Frankly, I’d welcome it if Ukraine and its partners could extend that buffer along the entire border with Russia, not just in the active combat zones. There are hundreds of kilometers of open frontier, and sealing that off would be a strategic masterstroke. It would certainly add layers of complexity, and I don’t know if London and Kyiv have even broached the subject yet—but it’s a conversation worth having.

Now, circling back to where we started—Kursk Oblast. If Syrski and Zelensky had reason to believe that this was the direction the United Kingdom was heading in, that a ceasefire framework was being shaped along these lines, then their decision to pull out of Kursk starts to make sense.

Think about it. What’s the point of holding Russian territory if a ceasefire is imminent—one based on current frontlines? Putin was never going to entertain a territorial exchange. His stance would be simple: If there’s to be a deal, they withdraw, and we talk only about the positions as they stand now. Holding ground inside Russia wouldn’t strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating hand—it would just complicate things and risk sabotaging the talks entirely.

Sure, there may have been other factors Syrski considered. But this one—understanding the shape of what was coming—must have been on the table. In that light, the withdrawal from Kursk wasn’t a retreat. It was a calculated move in anticipation of a political reality.

And now, it all makes a lot more sense.