Ukraine Quietly Breaks Away from American Control
The Slow and Silent Divorce
I woke up this morning to the news that the Trump administration has promised “air and intelligence support” for Ukraine and Europe as part of its planned post-war security guarantees. The offer was dressed up like a box of chocolates — sweet enough to calm allies, but empty once unwrapped.
This move is hardly surprising.
Washington has a habit of promising the world up front, only to attach fine-print ‘review mechanisms’ that quietly neuter its commitments later. Think of it like buying a car: the dealer assures you of lifetime service, but when you return for a repair, they explain there’s now a “review mechanism.” All service requests must be approved by someone far away, and if your case is denied, you’re out of luck. Then they sweeten the pain with promises of “double service for free” on your next car — but by then, you know better.
The buyer gets the message. They know that the seller’s promises are no better than those made by Russia. And while they may continue purchasing cars because no alternative dealer exists, they are already working on a polite disengagement.
That is exactly where Ukraine and Europe stand today with Washington.
Ukraine has been quietly, steadily withdrawing from American operational control. In 2022, during the Kherson campaign, battlefield plans were openly discussed and refined with the United States. By the summer of 2023, during the Kursk offensive, plans were no longer shared. Today, Kyiv doesn’t even seek American advice on whether or not to strike enemy assets with its own weapons.
President Volodymyr Zelensky underlined this shift when he told reporters this week that Ukraine does not discuss strikes inside Russia when using its own weapons.
This is a massive development — one that, if the Pentagon and CIA are paying attention, signals a directional break. If Ukraine can operate independently — taking out enemy assets with its own weapons, using its own data — then the long-term hold of American weapons in the Western world will eventually collapse.
The United States talks so much about “intelligence sharing” in its security guarantees for a reason: they know how decisive it is. Their weapons are powerful, but they are designed to operate with U.S.-provided intelligence feeds. Without that data, their systems lose much of their edge. Washington also knows that Europe and Ukraine cannot currently match the scale of U.S. intelligence capabilities. That dependency is what makes intelligence sharing the most critical lever of American influence.
But what happens when Ukraine demonstrates it can run its own kill chain? What happens when it can target and strike Russian assets with precision using European-made drones and its own data?
This isn’t a theoretical question.
The pace of the disengagement is continuing to accelerate. In August 2023, the first month of the Kursk invasion, Ukraine rolled in almost entirely with European weapons. Not a single American system crossed the border until weeks later. By the time U.S. Bradleys finally appeared, Ukraine had already opened the front with its own means.
Every day the Pentagon insists on review mechanisms to dictate battlefield terms, it pushes Ukraine further away. Each review reinforces the same truth: dependency is dangerous. That dependency can one day kill them. Ukraine faces a stark choice — either break free from it or risk being destroyed by it. The move to start using their own data, or intelligence supported by European partners, marks a deliberate step toward reducing that dependency.
The shift becomes even clearer when viewed alongside German and European technological developments. German-made long-range drones are now entering Ukrainian service, while Netherlands is working with Ukraine to build more than half a million drones over the next 12 months. There is little doubt about the data feeds they are plugged into.
If these drones enter the invaders territory, then it is not going to be American data.
The time has come for the UK, France, Germany, and Ukraine to build their own joint intelligence network — one that is not only independent of Washington, but fully supported by European satellites, sensors, and HUMINT capabilities. Europe already has the industrial and technological base: France has proven space-launch capacity, Germany has the industrial weight, the UK fields world-class SIGINT, and Ukraine brings unmatched battlefield intelligence against Russia.
Combined, this would create a sovereign European intelligence backbone — a system capable of providing real-time targeting data without waiting for American approval.
Such a network would do more than reduce dependency; it would redefine Europe’s strategic autonomy. With satellites mapping Russian positions, airborne systems feeding live imagery, and Ukrainian operators closing the kill chain, Europe would no longer need to plead for access to U.S. feeds. It would be operating on its own terms. Once the American dependency is broken — and it already is in part — it will only be a matter of time before the rest of Washington’s control mechanisms fall away.
Every day spent strengthening this capacity makes Europe less reliant on American review boards and more able to stand on its own feet.
Intelligence, satellite internet, air-defense and fighter jets are the last four remaining American strangleholds. Rest has been taken care off.
Consider the state of artillery production. At the start of the war, Europe was completely dependent on U.S. stockpiles of artillery shells.
Fast forward to today. Rheinmetall — one German company — now produces more artillery shells than the entire United States. Unlike Washington, Rheinmetall did not scale back after peaking. Instead, it pushed ahead with new factories. Two are already under construction in Ukraine, with two more in Bulgaria. I firmly believe that CEO Armin Papperger is targeting an output of 4,000 shells per day.
Right now, Rheinmetall is producing about 2,000 shells daily.
They will get to 4,000.
Papperger’s vision and execution under constant Russian threats make him one of the most consequential industrial leaders of this war. His production numbers are not just impressive — they are transformative. A sustained output of 4,000 shells per day will permanently alter the balance of European defense production versus U.S. defense dependency.
Meanwhile, the Czech Republic confirmed its own scheduled artillery deliveries — a total of 1.8 million shells for 2025 — are running on time, and their effects are already being felt on the battlefield.
On August 25th, I wrote that Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi had seized the initiative on the battlefield. Yesterday, a major German publication echoed that assessment — declaring the outright failure of Russia’s summer offensive.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is stalled. Despite four years of war and a massive summer offensive in 2025, Putin's army is falling short of expectations.
Oh, well!
Absorb this fact:
Russia now has 630,000 troops stationed inside occupied Ukrainian territory. That is three times the number that rolled across the border in February 2022.
North Korea is supplying Russia with weapons at full tilt.
Europe only mobilized funds in May and weapons started flowing after June.
U.S. weapons only trickled in during this period, and every unit Washington promised since July 11th is still stuck in the pipeline.
And yet, despite this, Russia’s summer offensive has failed. In August.
That failure deserves recognition. It is a turning point that cannot be spun into a Russian “victory” without willful distortion. Of all the publications in the United States, it was NewYork Post, that took trolling to the next level. I am not sure what they did here. Did they call Trump a fool or did they say Putin thinks Trump can be fooled. If Putin thinks Trump can be fooled, and the post says so, does that mean they are saying Trump is a fool?
Yikes. I am totally confused. Please read this and tell me.
And this is their editorial by the way.
We expect Russia’s Vladimir Putin and his top minions to soon regret their decision to make a fool of President Donald Trump.
That is, Putin’s displaying “the art of the no-deal” — and treating Trump like a sucker for believing everything he said to the contrary in Anchorage.
The Russian plainly thinks he’ll get away with humiliating the leader of the Free World; it won’t be pretty when Trump finally moves to dispel that delusion.
Treating Trump like a sucker? Fool-Sucker-Humiliating. Wow.
Whatever the spin, one thing is now clear: Murdoch’s publications have turned completely against Putin. Or, to put it more bluntly, they are pushing the narrative that protects the long-term future of the U.S. defense industrial complex. That alignment puts them squarely on the opposite path as the “bro gang” inside the Pentagon — and against Trump’s own desperate scramble to secure any deal he can from Russia.
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The New York Post is not only calling Hippo Don a fool, they are goading him to take action against Putin:
"it won’t be pretty when Trump finally moves to dispel that delusion."
Hippo Don would rather die than put a knife to Putin's throat...
Could you do a piece on how much Ukrainian land has been taken by Russia over time. Starting I guess with Crimea in 2014, then the progress of the non-Russian Russian masked invasion of the Donbas and then of course the "Special operation", together with the re-take of the Northern section that Ukraine had an early success with followed then I guess by the slow, slow forward progress of the frontline over the past 24 months or so. We often hear about the 20% of Ukrainian territory that Russia holds but they must have held quite a bit of that before the "Special Operation" began in 2022. It would be interesting to know how much land they have taken since taking over 1m casualties