Ukraine Is Letting Russia Bleed Itself Dry

While the Kremlin shifts to desperate drone strikes and reinforced pockets, Syrskyi is stalling for something bigger—and Europe is quietly arming him for it.

Russian military bloggers are furious with the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief’s tactics in the Sumy region. One of them is practically shouting—but he’s also making a valid point:

The situation near Alekseevka is worsening

The situation on the Sumy front is deteriorating. After Ukrainian forces captured Kondratovka, enemy assault groups launched an attack on the next village – Alekseevka.

Currently, special operations units have been deployed to Alekseevka, which has already seriously complicated operations in this area. Regardless of how one feels about the enemy's special forces, these are the most well-trained units.

In addition to them, a huge number of assault troops from the 425th Separate Assault Regiment are operating in this sector. So many have been transferred here that a couple of companies from the 425th SAR have started being redeployed to the Kharkiv region to stabilize the Velykoburluk direction.

Therefore, the situation is extremely difficult at the moment; fighting is ongoing, and the enemy is pressing not only with numbers but also with quality, not to mention the number of UAVs being used to strike our fighters.

The Russian military blogger is referring to this town in the Sumy region, which I’ve highlighted in yellow in the image below.

Ukraine had been encircling this town for some time, and Russia has started reinforcing the pocket with additional troops. Given how heavily Syrskyi has reinforced this sector, take a look at the troop concentrations far behind the front line in the image below.

If Syrskyi had really wanted to clear that little town, he could have done it easily. But instead, he trapped the Russians in a vice, chose not to finish them off, and let them reinforce the area. Now he’s content to keep pounding them—slowly, relentlessly.

Oh well.

Meanwhile, the Russians are trying to shift the momentum across the older frontline with a mix of calculated aggression and a bit of luck, probing across multiple key locations to force Syrskyi’s hand.

On July 25, 2025, a global Starlink outage knocked out internet connectivity for about 2.5 hours, cutting off the entire frontline. Ukrainian drone feeds went dark. Recon systems went quiet. Communications broke down. Just as this happened, Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG) renewed their efforts to infiltrate Pokrovsk from the south. Some of them got in. Clearing operations are still underway.

And after a long absence, Russian armor is back on the battlefield. On July 26, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault involving up to 80 armored and motorized vehicles northeast of Siversk. The Russians have made some limited gains in that direction.

Siversk.

So yes, the Russians have stepped up their activity, and Ukraine has lost some ground along the older frontlines over the past week. At the same time, Russian forces remain under heavy pressure in the north.

But I’m still not concerned—and that confidence comes down to one key data point.

If casualty numbers spike above 1,500, and Ukraine starts losing ground—and both of those happen after Syrskyi has already committed all the troops currently held in reserve for the Sumy axis—then yes, I’ll hit the panic button.

But that hasn’t happened. Right now, it feels like Syrskyi is waiting for something. I’m not sure what his real plan is. But I am extremely sure that he is burning time deliberately.

Could it be because four brigades—the 129th, 125th, 127th, and 128th, have transitioned and more are in the process of transforming into heavy mechanized brigades?

Someone is clearly sending Ukraine a serious amount of heavy gear. I just wish it were still 2023—back when every country rushed to announce their shipments the moment they sent anything. But that era is over, and frankly, I’m glad. It forces me to work my backside off, piecing things together only after they happen—not before. Which, honestly, is how it should be.

Case in point: four brigades were upgraded to heavy mechanized status in the last two weeks. That kind of transformation doesn’t come out of nowhere. This isn’t gear falling out of the sky overnight. What we’re seeing now is the delayed result of a concerted European effort that kicked into high gear after March 20, 2025. Month after month, commitments were made—and delivered. Money. Equipment. At levels far beyond anything seen last year.

What we’re witnessing today is the cumulative impact of those efforts—both from the Biden administration in its final stretch, and from allies who scrambled to hold the line after the alliance nearly fell apart following that globally televised brawl between Trump, Zelensky, and JD Vance on February 28th.

Germany has pledged close to €9 billion in aid for 2025, including a massive €5 billion military package announced in May. Norway, after taking things slow for most of the war, made a sharp pivot in March—parliament approved an extraordinary increase that brought its 2025 commitment to €7.2 billion, most of it earmarked for military systems, drones, and ammunition. The United Kingdom has committed around £4.5 billion, maintaining its pledge of £3 billion annually in military aid through 2030.

In total, just these three nations have committed over €20 billion to Ukraine this year. But how much has actually arrived? Norway made its announcement in March, Germany followed in May, and now we are in late July.

Deliveries are only just beginning to move.

This is exactly why, in my earlier assessments, I argued that Ukraine would be better off staying in full defensive mode until the end of the current quarter—then plan something big for the final stretch of the year. But Ukraine is Ukraine. They rarely do what’s strictly logical, and they prefer to keep things fluid.

Both Zelensky and Syrskyi made it clear early last month: the days of pure defense are over. Ukraine, they said, would now shift dynamically between offense and defense as needed.

Two days after those announcements, Ukrainian forces began hammering Russian positions in the Sumy sector.

So what’s next?

I believe this is the final quarter in which Russia still has some room to take risks. The economic chaos is starting to seep into every layer of the war machine—and soon, it will be visible on the frontlines. To offset this slow-moving train wreck, Putin is realigning his offensive posture toward drones and missiles. There are early signs that Russia is shifting from widespread, scattered attacks to more concentrated, high-impact strikes on specific targets.

On July 26, Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported that Russia hit the city with four guided glide bombs (KABs), two ballistic missiles, and 15 Shahed-type drones. Civilians and first responders were injured. This wasn’t the first time Russia targeted Kharkiv—but the frequency has changed. These attacks are now regular, calculated, and focused.

Kharkiv’s proximity to the border—less than 50 kilometers—makes it a soft, densely populated target. For Putin, these strikes are not just tactical. They’re symbolic. Missiles and drones are now his best hope to maintain the illusion that he can still win. That means Kharkiv City is going to remain under fire.

But the allies aren’t blind to what’s coming. That’s likely why Chancellor Merz, when he appealed to the U.S. President for permission to buy weapons for Ukraine, started with air-defense systems. The urgency is understood, and Western partners are doing what they can to accelerate deliveries.

There were reports recently suggesting Germany had already delivered these systems to Ukraine. That’s not accurate. But it’s also incorrect to say Ukraine won’t receive anything until mid-next year. I’m reasonably confident that at least two air-defense units will arrive in Ukraine within the next three months. Additional IRIS-T medium-range batteries are expected to follow.

So when you read that Ukraine has lost some ground here or there—don’t panic. The real battle is shifting away from the trench lines.

The next phase of the war will be fought in the air. And whichever side can strike deeper—and defend better—will shape the outcome. That’s why supplying Ukraine with air-defense systems is absolutely critical. But just as important is giving them the tools to hit back, deep behind Russian lines.

Because wars are not just won by holding the line. They're won by breaking the enemy's depth.

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