The Circle Route: Why the U.S. Is Selling Patriots to NATO Instead of Ukraine

Agressive repositioning.

I saw the news.

You probably did too.

Hours went by as I turned it over in my mind, weighing the implications, dreading the moment I’d have to write about it. By yesterday evening, it became clear: something had shifted. Washington, D.C. was moving at a speed we haven’t seen in months.

Years, may be.

First came the $1.3 billion Patriot interceptor order — a story I had covered in an earlier piece. But this wasn’t just about procurement. The decision to publicly announce it shattered a long-held narrative — that America was too low on stockpiles to support its allies effectively. In one decisive move, the national security bloc in Washington proved otherwise.

Then Reuters dropped another hammer: “The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved $500 million in security assistance for Ukraine as part of its draft Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act — which also blocks the retirement of A-10 aircraft.”

That vote edged the U.S. another step closer to Ukraine, and one step further from Putin. And just as that was sinking in, US media reported that something big might be coming from the administration as early as Monday.

The Institute for the Study of War reported this earlier today:

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.

Trump stated in an interview with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine.

Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one.

It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems—or which specific configurations—the United States plans to sell to NATO. The Institute for the Study of War continues to assess that U.S.-provided Patriots and their interceptors are critical to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range missile barrages, especially the ballistic strikes that typically hit civilian targets overnight.

But the numbers—and the form—still remain a mystery. From what I’ve gathered, discussions are ongoing around three potential units. Whether these will be full batteries or a mix of one battery and two fire units is still under negotiation. For context: a full Patriot battery includes not just the launchers, but also the radar, engagement control station, power units, antenna mast group, and other logistics elements that make the system fully autonomous and highly mobile. A fire unit, on the other hand, is a stripped-down package—typically just a radar, a control station, and a couple of launchers. It’s the minimum configuration needed to operate a Patriot system, usually deployed when inventory is tight or when supplementing an existing battery.

But the more pressing question is strategic: why the circle? Why is the U.S. selling Patriots to NATO, which will then hand them to Ukraine—rather than Germany or Norway simply buying the systems and sending them directly?

There are multiple layers here. The first is optics. This arrangement prevents any one country from being the political face of the escalation. The Trump administration, in particular, can avoid attacks from its isolationist flank by presenting this as a NATO-level decision rather than a unilateral U.S. move. Similarly, if Berlin or Oslo were seen to be directly purchasing and delivering Patriot systems to a country at war, their domestic opposition parties would seize on it as warmongering. Offloading that burden to NATO dilutes accountability.

But the deeper reason is structural. This is a classic example of the "reposition rather than produce" strategy the U.S. often uses when inventory is tight. Instead of ramping up new Patriot missile production—an expensive and time-consuming effort—the U.S. simply redistributes existing assets from one theater to another. That’s almost certainly what’s happening here. The systems going to Ukraine are not rolling off a new assembly line; they’re being diverted from current NATO stockpiles or U.S. regional deployments.

The U.S. almost certainly won’t touch the batteries stationed inside its own borders. More likely, it will pull from forward-deployed units — especially those already positioned in Europe as part of NATO's integrated defense.

Using NATO as the middleman allows for flexibility down the line. Once the war is over, these systems can be reassigned. NATO could rotate them back into European defense, or leave them with Ukraine as part of a long-term security architecture. No single country is left short of assets. The delivery is done in the name of NATO, and the accounting—both military and political—can be postponed.

This is not just about sending hardware. It’s about managing escalation, preserving inventories, and delaying tough decisions. All of it hidden beneath the label of "NATO logistics."

It’s not perfect, but it works. And that’s enough for now.

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