Pokrovsk Proves the Point: This War Ends in Rubles, Not Battles

Why Ukraine's tactical success and Russia's recruitment drive both point to the same conclusion

The strategy I outlined on August 25th (image above) is unfolding exactly as predicted. Western media didn't have time to analyze Ukraine's tactical approach in the Pokrovsk sector, but today's maps (image below) validate what seemed clear weeks ago.

The two prongs of Ukraine's advance have nearly closed the gap—just three kilometers separate them now. Ukrainian forces have maneuvered into position on nearly four sides of this contested zone, with a river cutting through the pocket, making any Russian withdrawal or reinforcement increasingly difficult. The terrain itself has become Ukraine's ally.

What we're witnessing isn't just tactical success—it's the methodical execution of a plan that seemed almost too clean on paper. Ukraine is poised to seize control of the critical three-kilometer stretch between Novotoretske and Razine. This doesn't mean Russia's entire right flank has crumbled, but rather that Ukraine has successfully pushed it back, creating vital breathing room for Pokrovsk's defenders. Once this connection is secured, Ukraine will have cleared Russian forces from over fifty square kilometers of strategically important ground.

Russia's response has been predictably desperate. Elite infantry units have been rushed to plug the gaps, while waves of expendable soldiers are thrown into what Ukrainian commanders describe as "highly attritional assaults." A deputy battalion commander operating in the sector put it bluntly: Russian command is treating these soldiers as disposable, subjecting them to attacks designed more to bleed Ukraine than achieve meaningful territorial gains. Yet none of these measures have stemmed the tide over the past two weeks.

The advance continues with mechanical precision—utterly predictable, as I noted in August, yet seemingly unstoppable. Even as fierce fighting rages on the right flank, Ukraine has maintained pressure on the left, successfully holding the recently captured settlements of Udachane and Daschenske despite Russian attempts to retake them.

For the first time in months, Ukraine holds the initiative in the Pokrovsk sector. Despite deploying over 100,000 troops, Russia cannot arrest its gradual slide. This isn't a dramatic collapse—it's something perhaps more dangerous for Moscow: the steady corrosion of positions once thought secure. And crucially, General Syrskyi isn't overreaching.

His objectives remain limited, achievable, and devastatingly effective. In two weeks he massively improved the saftey profile of Pokorvsk.

Some of my more informed readers have challenged my assessment that Russia is mobilizing troops for another wave of frontal assaults in the coming months. I understand their reasoning—the signs aren't always obvious, and Russia's mobilization efforts have been deliberately obscured. But today brings fresh confirmation of what I've been tracking, and this time it comes directly from Ukrainian Intelligence.

Russia is expected to fully meet its military recruitment targets by the end of 2025, as Moscow continues to rely on propaganda to mobilize its population and has the financial resources to sustain the effort, Deputy Chief of Defense Intelligence Vadym Skibitskyi said in an interview with Ukrinform on September 7.

“Unfortunately, they have the capacity, backed by finances and propaganda. Every month Russia recruits at least 35,000 servicemen. According to our data, as of September 1, 2025, the Kremlin had signed contracts with about 280,000 servicemen,” the intelligence official reported.

He emphasized that Russian contractors are offered considerable financial rewards. For instance, those signing a contract for the first time are promised up to $22,000.

“So there are all the signs that by the end of the year they will fully achieve their recruitment plan,” Skibitskyi said. He added that the enemy is also being reinforced by foreign forces, specifically mercenaries from North Korea.

There it is.

That 35,000 monthly recruitment baseline explains why Russia has so carefully managed its daily casualty rates, keeping them within the 800-1,200 band for over six months. They've been building reserves. The quality of these troops remains questionable, and their equipment allocation is another unknown—but the fundamental point stands: Russia is far from exhausted. These accumulated reserves represent man power strength, and they'll be committed to the battlefield soon enough.

The encouraging news is that Ukraine isn't operating blindly. Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi isn't pursuing reckless advances. He understands exactly what the enemy intends: Russia will push deeper into Donetsk while simultaneously pressuring Kupiansk in the north. Everything else—the probing attacks, the diversionary efforts across other sectors—serves to mask this dual-axis strategy.

Syrskyi's response has been methodical: he's pushing Russian front lines back in both Donetsk and near Kupiansk, disrupting their frontline positions before they can launch coordinated offensives. It's preemptive warfare at its most calculated.

Syriski is still holding a ton of troops in his reserve. Most of them are sitting deep in the Sumy Sector.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine is actually fighting at full capacity.

It is cat and mouse.

Now, report after report confirms what the economic data has been telegraphing for months: gasoline prices at Russian pumps have spiked sharply, and inflation is running at levels that would topple most governments. The economic screws are falling off one by one, yet Putin presses forward without any visible signs of retreat.

His confidence rests on one critical lifeline beyond sheer desperation: China's escalating support for Russian drone manufacturing. Yesterday's Institute for the Study of War report laid out this growing dependency in stark terms:

Russia has significantly scaled up its domestic production of Shahed-type drones, including Gerans (Russian Shahed analogues), Garpiyas (Shahed analogues with PRC components), and Gerberas (decoy Shahed variants).

Russia primarily produces Shahed-type drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and recently opened a new production line for Shahed-type drones at the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant where Russia already produces Garpiya drones.

Russia is increasingly relying on the PRC for its drone components and would not be able to sustain the pace or mass of its Shahed-type drone production without these components.

A recent investigation by the Ukraine-based, open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight found that the ASEZ alone depends on the PRC for at least 41 components to produce its long-range strike drones, including engines, electronic and mechanical components, batteries, antennas, radios, carbon fire, carburetors, and telecommunications components.

Frontelligence Insight assessed that many of the drones that Russia claims to have produced domestically are only assembled domestically given the high number of PRC-produced parts in these drones.

Russia also opened a dedicated logistics center at the ASEZ to receive and process cargo trains directly from the PRC, likely to streamline the delivery of PRC-produced components for drone production at the ASEZ."

But here's the crucial detail that reveals Russia's true desperation: Putin has been pleading with China to establish a financial institution capable of issuing bonds on Russia's behalf. He's actively seeking direct financial assistance from Beijing. So far, China hasn't bent—and anyone familiar with Beijing's approach to money understands why. China doesn't give handouts; it makes investments with guaranteed returns.

Even this drone component assistance comes with a price tag that's bleeding Russia's already strained finances. Yes, it enables Moscow to manufacture critical weapons systems they couldn't otherwise produce—but at what cost? Every component shipped from China represents another debt Russia will eventually have to settle, another slice of sovereignty mortgaged to Beijing.

This illuminates the fundamental truth: money remains Russia's Achilles heel, now more than ever. Rather than fixating on Chinese contributions to Russia's war machine, Europe should focus laser-like on the one strategy guaranteed to work—systematically choking off every revenue stream that keeps Putin's war economy breathing.

Of course, maintaining pressure on China remains essential—Beijing's support cannot be allowed to expand unchecked. But the strategic focus must never waver from the two levers that actually matter: systematically dismantling every source of Russian revenue funding this war, and relentlessly driving up Moscow's cost of waging it.

Master these twin objectives, and everything else—the diplomatic maneuvering, the endless debates over post war security guarentees for Ukraine and the rest—becomes mere background noise. The war's outcome will be decided by economics, not rhetoric. Starve Russia of money while making every bullet, every shell, every day of combat prohibitively expensive.

Execute this formula correctly, and Putin's war machine collapses under its own financial weight, regardless of how many drone components China ships or how many recruits Moscow can bribe into service.

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