North Korea is not a fix for Putin. It gives him time.

It is not going to help Putin turn things around.

Between November 1 and November 22, Russians have lost an average of 1,449 troops per day in Ukraine. This is three times the number of daily losses they experienced during the first year of the war. The steady increase in daily casualties has effectively bridged the quality gap between Russian elite units and regular units.

The regular units have not improved; rather, the elite units have averaged down.

ISW has assessed at length that the distinctions in quality between various Russian formations that existed prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have become increasingly obsolete because of the way Russia is prosecuting its war.

Russian formations that were once considered “elite” or more specialized in terms of the tactical tasks they were associated with, such as VDV or naval infantry units, are now essentially functioning as understrength motorized rifle units, relying on infantry-led frontal assaults to make tactical gains as opposed to employing any sort of doctrinally-unique tactics.

Russian casualty rates on the frontline have forced the Russian military command to prioritize rushing new recruits to backfill vacancies in new units over providing them with sufficient basic, much less specialist, training.

When casualty rates rise, such as increasing from 500 per day last month to 1,000 per day this month, the combat effectiveness of the battalions holding the front inevitably declines. To offset these losses, troops must be drawn from reserves. If the spike in casualties is a one-time event, it might be manageable. However, when the elevated casualty rate becomes sustained, the only viable option is to hastily recruit and deploy new soldiers to the front.

The Russian armed forces initially attempted to maintain three distinct training methods: a longer program for troops destined for elite VDV units, a shorter program for regular troops, and almost no training at all for ethnic minorities and prisoners conscripted as cannon fodder. Equipment distribution followed a similar hierarchy, with elite units receiving the best gear, followed by regular troops, and then poorly equipped “cannon fodder” units.

As casualty rates surged and Russia’s weapons stockpile dwindled, the distinctions between these groups eroded significantly. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), there is now little difference between the combat effectiveness of Russia’s VDV elite units and its regular troops.

Currently, Russia is rushing poorly trained and barely equipped recruits to the front, with its total troop strength in Ukraine nearing half a million. With this in mind, one must question how much of a difference the reported 12,000 North Korean troops will actually make in terms of combat power.

The impact of North Korean troops will certainly be noticeable in the specific areas where they are deployed. However, when considering the overall front, 12,000 troops mixed into a force of 500,000 is unlikely to make a significant difference. Putin’s real challenge is the need to quickly increase the density of North Korean troops in Ukraine. Yet, both the U.S. and Europe have countered effectively by relaxing the long-range restrictions previously placed on Western weapons, complicating his plans.

As a result, Putin must proceed quietly, introducing North Korean forces in small batches to avoid drawing domestic and international attention. This gradual approach, however, presents its own problems. It mirrors the strategy that the West initially imposed on Ukraine, where military aid was drip-fed rather than delivered in large quantities, giving Russia time to adapt and preventing any sudden shift in the battlefield dynamic. The status quo persisted as a result.

Putin is likely to integrate North Korean troops in a slow and methodical manner. This approach will not help reduce the high Russian casualty rates at the front. Despite the arrival of North Korean reinforcements, Russia’s transformation from a professional army with diverse capabilities into a mass infantry force will continue at a rapid and alarming pace.