Desperate Putin. Doubtful Zelensky

Can Europe handle this?

It’s intriguing to observe that the Russians appear genuinely uncertain about the direction President Trump’s incoming administration will take.

I found it somewhat surprising—though not shocking—when Putin recently floated the notion that “Trump’s life is under threat” during an interview. Upon investigating further, I discovered that Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former president and a prominent Kremlin figure, had employed the exact same narrative just one day before the U.S. elections.

“He cannot stop the war. Not in a day, not in three days, not in three months. And if he really tries, he can be the new Kennedy”, Medvedev said.

That’s not too far from what Putin said last week:

"By the way, in my opinion, he is not safe now," said Putin.

It’s not too hard to read between the lines. This is classic KGB rhetoric, now fully deployed by Putin himself. On one hand, the Kremlin praises Trump; on the other, they issue warnings for his safety. Adding to this, earlier this month, Russian state media—which operates entirely under Kremlin approval—broadcast vile and crude images of Melania Trump.

The Russians seem clueless.

Putin appears confused and is attempting to sow confusion in Trump’s camp. Zelensky, for his part, is employing a similar strategy. I found it unnecessary for him to float the idea of ending the active phase of the war in exchange for NATO membership for territories not under Russian control. While I understand his reasoning—laying groundwork for discussions with Western partners about a ceasefire—it feels premature.

Britain’s new National Security Advisor, Jonathan Powell, appointed just three days after Trump’s election victory, is a staunch advocate of the "fight and talk" approach, as is Trump’s envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg. These appointments are no coincidence, and Kyiv has clearly picked up on the shifting dynamics from 4,000 miles away. Instead of being blindsided, Zelensky preempted Putin’s potential move toward seeking a ceasefire by introducing terms Putin would struggle to accept.

If this were last year, I would have said Putin would never agree to such terms. But with the ruble trading above 100 against the dollar, Putin now needs a ceasefire more than anyone else. So I understand why Zelensky took this route. My only issue is why now? Why make it public?

Zelensky could have waited until January 21, 2025, giving himself six weeks to rally the West against Putin. A lot could happen in that time—perhaps a few more strikes on refineries, the ruble surpassing 134, or better utilization of Ukraine’s stockpile of drones and domestically built missiles. While they may not match the precision of U.S.-supplied ATACMS, these weapons still have significant destructive potential.

Alternatively, Zelensky could have communicated his plan privately to the incoming Trump administration and left it at that. Instead, he chose to make his stance public.

I believe both Putin and Zelensky are attempting to set expectations for the incoming Trump administration while also signaling to their respective constituents where things are heading.

This leads us to the question of the day: Can Ukraine sustain the war for another six months if Trump halts the flow of weapons?

This would have been much easier if the Biden administration had fulfilled its promise to fully utilize the remaining funds in the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) before January 20, 2024. As of December 2, 2024, there is atleast $3 billion left unspent.

When Congress passed the Ukraine aid package on April 24, 2024, they explicitly directed the Biden administration to use all available PDA funds by September 30. Yet, as of September 26, the administration still had a staggering $5.5 billion remaining in the PDA. In response, President Biden issued a statement announcing a surge in weapons shipments to help Ukraine win the war.

September 26: White House

To be honest, I was gobsmacked when he used those two words. $5.5 billion is a substantial amount of money. The U.S. possesses plenty of weapons capable of dramatically altering the course of the war. Deploying 40 HIMARS launchers and 1,000 ATACMS missiles, for example, could accelerate the destruction of Russian combat power. Victory didn’t seem out of reach because the right weapons, when massed at the front, can quickly shift the dynamics of the conflict.

The President announced a surge at the end of September. Since then, the United States has sent five aid packages.

1. $425 million (Oct 16)

2. $400 million (Oct 21)

3. $425 million (Nov 1)

4. $275 million (Nov 20)

5. $725 million (Dec 1)

That amounts to $2.25 billion. The administration still has $3 billion left in the PDA and six weeks remaining. The issue is that you can’t order weapons today and ship them tomorrow—delivering these systems takes time. If an announcement isn’t made within the next two weeks, the chances of these weapons never reaching the front lines become very real.

We also still lack information about the Patriot battery the administration promised to deliver back in June. Ukraine has not confirmed receiving the system. They always confirm when the get the Patriots.

It’s clear that the promised surge never materialized. This leaves Ukraine in a precarious position to continue resisting the invasion if the Trump administration halts weapons supplies. By failing to deliver on its commitments, the Biden administration has only deepened Ukraine’s reliance on the incoming administration.

That’s the unfortunate reality.

Now, if you were Zelensky, would you discuss ending the active phase of the war to buy time from the incoming administration, or would you take a defiant stance, declaring, “No matter what you do, we will keep fighting”?

It’s a tough position, isn’t it?

I worked tirelessly to help Biden become president in 2020, and I would have gladly done so again in 2024. It might be a drop in the blue ocean. It is still my drop. But that doesn’t mean I won’t call out his administration’s mistakes. This was a serious misstep by the President and his team.

Europe has stepped up to cover as much as they can, and I’ll delve into that in detail tomorrow. For now, the strategy seems to be focused on bolstering Ukraine’s capacity before the U.S. administration changes.

Will that be enough to sustain Ukraine for another six months? I’m not sure.

We don’t have complete details on the number of air-defense missiles, electronic warfare systems, and artillery shells the Biden administration has provided to Ukraine. Some resources can only come from the United States. If Ukraine has already received sufficient supplies—enough for three months or more—they might stand a chance of continuing the fight for another six months without further U.S. support.

If not, it will be much harder, leaving hopes pinned on the collapse of the Russian economy to bring an end to the war. That scenario isn’t out of the question either. If Ukraine intensifies its targeting of Russian economic assets, the resulting strain might become too much for Russia to endure.

Both sides are undeniably in a very difficult position.

The only positive news I see is that Europe has secured Ukraine’s economy, placing it on solid footing. This means there’s no need to worry about its stability in 2025. Putin, however, cannot say the same. Russia must find a way to sustain its war effort and protect the economy for the next six months. If Ukraine can hold out that long, Putin will likely face defeat. It will be an economic defeat.